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0003-3472/© 2018 The Association for the Study of APrimates spend a considerable amount of time grooming each other. Grooming is regularly found to be
traded reciprocally (for grooming) or for rank-related beneﬁts in the presence of food competition. It has
been suggested that if food sources are clustered and monopolizable, then lower-ranked individuals will
groom higher-ranked ones in order to be tolerated on food patches. This leads to grooming being
directed up the hierarchy. However, the conditions where this is expected to occur are based on verbal
reasoning alone, and no quantitative analysis of the conditions favouring grooming up the hierarchy
appear in the literature. Here, we develop a quantitative model investigating when food competition can
result in grooming up the hierarchy. Individuals are assumed to take actions pertaining to whom to
groom, where to feed and whom to tolerate on food patches. By allowing individuals to choose actions
according to reinforcement learning, we delineate conditions where groups of individuals will express
reciprocal grooming and grooming up the hierarchy depending on environmental conditions (e.g.
quality, number of food patches). In particular, we show that conditions of intense food competition may
lead to less grooming up the hierarchy. The predictions of our model could guide future comparative
studies and meta-analyses investigating social relationships in primates.
© 2018 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Primates spend a signiﬁcant proportion of their daily time
budget grooming other individuals: picking through fur to remove
ectoparasites and clean the skin (social grooming, hereafter
grooming; Dunbar,1991). This observationmay come as no surprise
since being groomed is beneﬁcial due to the removal of ectopara-
sites (Tanaka & Takefushi, 1993). Furthermore, grooming has an
important social function, where social bonds between individuals
are reinforced through the act of grooming. It has been argued that
grooming behaviour has evolved because of these beneﬁts (Dunbar,
1991). However, there can also be costs associated with giving
grooming. These come in the form of opportunity costs (not being
able to use the time or energy for other activities), such as reduced
vigilance (Barrett & Henzi, 2006; Maestripieri, 1993). Thus,
grooming behaviour can potentially be exploited, whereby within a
pair of individuals only onemakes the investment to groom and the
other reaps the beneﬁt without reciprocating. Understanding the
causal proximate and ultimate factors inﬂuencing individualand Evolution, University of
).
nimal Behaviour. Published by Elsgrooming decisions is a long-standing goal in primatology (Schino,
2001; Seyfarth, 1980).
Grooming can be thought of as a commodity that can be traded,
where individuals give grooming in order to receive something
back. If grooming is solely traded for grooming, then pairs of in-
dividuals are expected to trade equal amounts of grooming.
Numerous studies do indeed report a so-called time matching of
grooming between individuals (Barrett, Henzi, Weingrill, Lycett, &
Hill, 1999; Leinfelder, de Vries, Deleu, & Nelissen, 2001; Pazol &
Cords, 2005; Rowell, Wilson, & Cords, 1991). Here, the individuals
in a dyad are found to spend an approximately equal amount of
time grooming each other, either within a single grooming bout or
over a longer period of time. However, primate troops are nearly
always characterized by a dominance hierarchy, and grooming in-
teractions occur between individuals of different ranks. In a sig-
niﬁcant proportion of studies, grooming is observed to be directed
up the hierarchy, that is, higher-ranked individuals receive more
grooming than lower-ranked ones. Hence, grooming decisions are
likely to depend on factors other than just the exchange of
grooming. In other words, grooming of high-ranked by low-ranked
individuals is likely to be traded for beneﬁts other than groomingevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Table 1
List of model parameters
Parameter Equations Meaning
c 6 Cost of grooming
b 6, 10 Beneﬁt of being groomed
g 6 Change in motivation when not grooming
l 4, 8 Exploration rate
d 5, 9, 10 Discount factor
b 11 Regulate probability of engaging in a contest
ε 10 Impact of eviction
d 1, 7 Dominance gradient
q0 3 Reference patch quality
m 2 Interference
N Group size
NP Number of patches
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185166(Roubova, Konecna, Smilauer, & Wallner, 2015; Seyfarth, 1980;
Ventura, Majolo, Koyama, Hardie, & Schino, 2006; Wei et al., 2012).
What are the beneﬁts that can explain grooming up the hier-
archy? The socioecological model of primatology is concerned with
the causes and consequences of food competition and its effect on
social relationships (Kappeler & van Schaik, 2002). Within this
framework it is argued that under conditions where individuals
compete over food resources low-ranked individuals may trade
grooming for nongrooming beneﬁts provided by high-ranked ones
(Kappeler & van Schaik, 2002; van Schaik, 1989; Sterck, Watts, &
van Schaik, 1997). If food sources (or patches) are clumped and
monopolizable, then individuals are expected to defend food
sources or attempt to displace one another from them. Here, co-
alitionsmay be formed between individuals, either to defend a food
source or to displace others from it. Then, low-ranking individuals
may groom higher-ranking individuals to gain coalitionary support
in agonistic interactions (Carne, Wiper, & Semple, 2011; Schino,
2007; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1984; Seyfarth, 1980). Experimental evi-
dence for grooming being traded for coalitionary support can be
found in baboons, Papio hamadryas, and vervet monkeys, Chlor-
ocebus pygerythrus (Borgeaud & Bshary, 2015; Cheney, Moscovice,
Heesen, Mundry, & Seyfarth, 2010). Owing to the trading of
grooming by low-ranked individuals for such support from high-
ranked individuals, on average grooming should be directed up
the hierarchy.
Grooming can also be traded for increased tolerance (reduced
aggression) for a low-ranked individual by a high-ranked one on a
food source (Henzi& Barrett, 1999). This relies on broadly the same
ecological conditions as the grooming under the coalitionary sup-
port hypothesis. If food sources are monopolizable then, instead of
attempting to displace a higher-ranked individual, the low-ranked
individual may groom the higher-ranked one in order to be toler-
ated by that individual on the food source. Like the coalitionary
support hypothesis, there is empirical evidence showing that
grooming for tolerance occurs (Carne et al., 2011; Tiddi, Aureli,
Polizzi di Sorrentino, Janson, & Schino, 2011; Ventura et al., 2006;
Xia, Garber, Sun, Zhu, & Sun, 2012). Furthermore, while most pri-
mate studies rely on correlational data, it has been shown experi-
mentally that vervet monkeys trade grooming for short-term
tolerance (Borgeaud & Bshary, 2015).
There thus exists ample empirical support that grooming may
be directed up the hierarchy, when it is traded for either coalitio-
nary support or tolerance. However, the conditions under which
this is expected to occur are mainly based on verbal models (van
Schaik, 1989; Sterck et al., 1997; Wrangham, 1980), and there are
few quantitative predictions as to the conditions under which
grooming will be directed up the hierarchy and those grooming
patterns that will be associated with it (which individuals receive
extra grooming; Dunbar, 2002). One of the few models investi-
gating grooming up the hierarchy is Seyfarth's (1977) model. In this
quantitative model individuals make grooming decisions based on
the ‘attractiveness’ of potential recipients. The attractiveness of an
individual as grooming partner depends on the rank of that indi-
vidual, since rank inﬂuences the likelihood of successfully sup-
porting the focal individual in an agonistic interaction, and thus the
highest-ranked individual is the most attractive grooming partner.
The model managed to replicate two features that are typically
found in various primate species: high-ranking individuals receive
more grooming than low-ranking ones and individuals of adjacent
rank groom each other more than expected by chance alone
(Seyfarth, 1977). In an extension of this model, various types of
competition for grooming access were investigated (Sambrook,
Whiten, & Strum, 1995). However, both models explicitly
assumed that high-ranked individuals are attractive grooming
partners, and thus the grooming decisions are not linked directly tothe intensity of food competition itself. It would thus be relevant to
have a quantitative model that links endogenous grooming de-
cisions to the mode of food competition and that could determine
conditions under which grooming up the hierarchy occurs as an
equilibrium behaviour.
Here, we present a reinforcement learning (individual-based)
model in which a group of individuals have grooming and feeding
interactions, whose payoff consequences (‘rewards’) affect groom-
ing, feeding and tolerance decisions. This allows us to determine
conditions under which food competition can lead to grooming
being directed up the hierarchy under the grooming for tolerance
hypothesis. Although grooming occurs frequently between kin, a
meta-analysis demonstrated a signiﬁcant effect of grooming reci-
procity among nonkin (Schino & Aureli, 2008). Since our main in-
terest here is the effect of food competition, we assume that
individuals in the model are unrelated. However, we further as-
sume that individuals spend their entire life together, which cor-
responds to the philopatric sex, and this typically means the
females in primates (Pusey & Packer, 1987). The main questions
that we address with this model are: (1) can food competition
result in grooming up the hierarchy as an equilibrium behaviour
when individuals decide whom to groom, where to feed and whom
to evict, dynamically according to payoffs, (2) what kind of
grooming patterns are expected if grooming is directed up the hi-
erarchy (e.g. do all individuals groom the alpha individual, or do
they mostly groom one rank up the hierarchy), and (3) to what
extent does the strength of competition (due to the number of
patches or the aggressiveness of individuals) modulate grooming
up the hierarchy?THE MODEL
The Biological Setting
We consider a group of N individuals ranked in a stable, linear
dominance hierarchy where individual i2 {1, 2, ..., N} has a unique
rank ri ¼ i 2 {1, 2, ..., N}. Individual i ¼ 1 is the lowest-ranked and
i ¼ N is the highest-ranked or alpha individual. Individuals within
this group interact with each other for T discrete time steps, which
can be thought of as the number of interactions on a daily basis,
monthly basis, yearly basis, etc. Each interaction time step t ¼ 1, 2, ...,
T is characterized by four sequential behavioural stages: grooming,
food patch selection, aggressive interactions and feeding, which
occur in this order and that we now detail.Stage 1: Grooming
Each individual either selects an individual that it grooms or it
grooms no one. The set of actions available to individual i in this
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185 167stage is denoted Ai ¼ {0, 1, 2, ..., i  1, i þ 1, ..., N}, where j2 Ai is the
rank of the recipient of the act of grooming, and where j ¼ 0 means
that individual i grooms no one. Grooming incurs a payoff cost c to
the groomer, while contributing a payoff beneﬁt b to the groomee
(see Table 1 for a list of parameters).
Stage 2: Selecting a food patch
Each individual selects a food patch out of NP available patches
to feed on. We denote by P ¼ {1, 2, ..., NP} the set of food patches so
that action k2 P means an individual has selected food patch k. A
food patch is deﬁned as an area containing one or more sources of
food, fromwhich multiple individuals can feed, but that can also be
monopolized by a single individual.
Stage 3: Aggressive interactions
After all individuals have chosen a patch, each makes a binary
decision for every other individual on the same patch, whether to
engage in a contest or not. Because we assume that individuals can
only engage in a contest with others on the same food patch, we
denote by Ei,t ⊆ Ai the set of individuals that are on the same patch
as i at time t.
After each individual has selected its targets (or no one) to
attack, a contest occurs between the aggressor and the target, and
the loser of this contest gets evicted from the patch. We adhere to
the following rules for contests. (1) Individual i engaging in a
contest with j is sufﬁcient for a contest to occur between i and j (it is
not required that j also wants to engage in a contest with i). (2) To
each individual we associate an array of target individuals. The
order in which the contests occur is determined by random sam-
pling (without replacement) from this array. (3) Individuals that
have lost a single contest will not engage in any further contests in
the current time step, as they are evicted from the patch. This thus
means that selecting a target to attack does not necessarily mean
that the focal individual and the target will have a contest, as one
(or both) of them may be evicted by another individual before the
contest occurs.
We assume that the contest does not incur any costs, as these
interactions are often settled without physical contact (covert in-
teractions). The outcome of each interaction is given by a contest
success function (e.g. Hirshleifer, 1989) so that individual i inter-
acting with j wins the contest with probability
expðdriÞ
expðdriÞ þ exp

drj
 ; (1)
where d  0 is the dominance gradient, which determines the in-
ﬂuence of the ranks of the individuals on the outcome of the
contest. If d ¼ 0, then rank has no inﬂuence on the outcome and
both individuals are equally likely to win, but if d/∞ the higher-
ranked individual is almost certain to win the contest.
Stage 4: Feeding
After aggression has occurred, individuals feed. We use the
interference model to compute the payoff individuals gain on a
given patch (Parker& Sutherland,1986; Sutherland& Parker,1992).
The payoff per individual on patch k at time t is given by
pPk;t ¼
Qk
Nmk;t
; (2)
where Qk > 0 is the quality of patch k, Nk,t is the number of in-
dividuals on patch k at time t during the feeding stage and thus
after contests and eviction have occurred. The parameter m  0
describes the interference between individuals on a food patch (alarger m resulting in a greater decrease in payoff when an addi-
tional individual feeds on the patch). Thus, individuals beneﬁt from
evicting others as the payoff increases when there are fewer com-
petitors. After all individuals have fed, the groupmixes again so that
in the following time step each individual can have a grooming
interaction with any other individual of the group again. As we are
not interested here in the survival effects of feeding, we assume
that evicted individuals feed on a low-quality source that is abun-
dant enough to ensure their survival.
We consider three different scenarios regarding how the quality
of patches is determined. (1) All patches are of equal quality, so that
Qk ¼ q0 for all k and q0 is used as a baseline quality. (2) Half the
patches are of high quality (equal to q0), while the other half are low
quality (equal to 0.5q0). In cases where the number of patches is
odd, there is one extra high-quality patch. (3) The quality of patch k
is given by
Qk ¼ q0

1
1:2
ðk1Þ
; (3)
thus, all patches differ in quality, where the quality asymptotically
decreases with increasing k.
Learning and Decision-making Processes
Individuals take actions in three stages during an interaction
step: whom to groom, select a food patch and whom to evict. We
assume that individuals learn which action to play by way of
reinforcement learning. We follow standard reinforcement
learning models as used in biology and game theory (e.g. Achbany,
Fouss, Yen, Pirotte, & Saerens, 2006; Arbilly, Motro, Feldman, &
Lotem, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Camerer & Hua Ho, 1999; Dridi &
Lehmann, 2014, 2015; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Hamblin &
Giraldeau, 2009; Harley, 1981; McNamara & Houston, 1985), and
assume that each individual has internal motivations (or attrac-
tions) for each action, which get updated as a function of time ac-
cording to payoff received and allows the individual to express
actions in a probabilistic way (e.g. Camerer& Hua Ho,1999; Dridi&
Lehmann, 2014, 2015; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998).
Action choice and motivation dynamics
Action choice for grooming (stage 1). The probability pGi;tðjÞ that in-
dividual i takes action j2 Ai during the grooming stage (i.e. grooms
individual js i or grooming no one if j ¼ 0) at time step t is given by
pGi;tðjÞ ¼
exp
h
lMGi;tðjÞ
i
P
q2Ai exp
h
lMGi;tðqÞ
i ; (4)
where MGi;tðjÞ is the motivation that individual i has at time t for
action j2 Ai (and can be thought of as the cumulative reward up to
t of taking that action) and is assumed to be a real-valued number
(MGi;tðjÞ2 ℝ). Each individual takes a single action j2 Ai each time
step. Equation (4) is the standard logit choice rule for reinforcement
learning of decision theory and neuroscience (e.g. Camerer & Hua
Ho, 1999; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; Sutton & Barto, 1998), and
has been used in behavioural ecology (e.g. Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011a,
2011b; Dridi& Lehmann, 2015; see Dridi& Lehmann, 2014 formore
details and justiﬁcations on the framework we use here). The
parameter l  0 therein can be seen as the sensitivity to motiva-
tions or exploration rate: if l ¼ 0 each action is chosen with equal
probability regardless of motivation; if l/∞ the action with the
highest motivation is chosen almost deterministically.
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185168The change DMGi;tðjÞ ¼MGi;tþ1ðjÞMGi;tðjÞ in motivation (or attrac-
tion) of individual i for action j2 Ai at time step t  1 is assumed to
take the form
DMGi;tðjÞ ¼ dMGi;tðjÞ þ pGij;t þ pFij;t : (5)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is a decay of motivation
(for instance due to loss of memory) of i for action j, with discount
factor d. The second term, pGij;t , reﬂects the change in motivation
due to grooming and is given by
pGij;t ¼
(
bIGj/i;t  cIGi/j;t ; if j2Ai\0
gIGi/j;t ; if j ¼ 0;
(6)
where IGi/j;t is an indicator function equal to 1 if i grooms j at time t
and 0 otherwise. The payoff g that i obtains if it grooms no one is
the reinforcement of not grooming again in the next time step.
Assuming b > 0 and c > 0, the motivation of individual i to groom j
thus increases with receiving grooming from j, but decreases if i
grooms j.
The third term in equation (5) is the (motivational) payoff
pFij;t ¼ ICij;tpPkðijÞ;t
 
1
2
 expðdriÞ
expðdriÞ þ exp

drj

!
(7)
due to co-feeding. This depends on ICij;t , which is equal to 1 if i and j
feed on the same patch at time t and 0 otherwise. When i and j feed
on the same patch, individual i obtains material payoff pPkðijÞ;t
(equation (2)), where k(ij) is the patch on which i and j co-feed. We
assume that the motivation reinforcement due to co-feeding
(equation (7)) is proportional to this payoff and (1/2eexp(dri)/
[exp(dri) þ exp(drj)]). The term in parentheses causes the rein-
forcement to be positive if i has a lower rank than j, and negative if
the rank of i is higher. Hence, we assume that a higher-ranked in-
dividual will decrease its motivation to groom a lower-ranked one
after feeding together on a patch (since if it tolerates the lower-
ranked individual, it should decrease its tendency to groom),
while the low-ranked individual will increase its motivation to
groom the high-ranked one. However, in the absence of a domi-
nance gradient (d ¼ 0), the reinforcement to grooming motivation
is 0 regardless of rank.
We note that the reinforcement learning rule for motivation
implemented by equation (5) (and those given below) is an
example of the so-called relative payoff sum rule (Dridi& Lehmann,
2014; Hamblin & Giraldeau, 2009; Harley, 1981), where payoff over
time is simply accumulated, and where the cumulated payoff de-
cays at rate d.1
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Figure 1. Probability of engaging in a contest with an individual as a function of
motivation (equation (11)). Higher motivation for tolerance decreases the probability
of engaging in a contest with the individual, while higher aggressiveness (b) increases
the probability of engaging in a contest.Action choice for patch selection (stage 2). The probability that at
time t individual i selects patch k2 P for feeding is assumed to be
given by
pPi;tðkÞ ¼
exp
h
lMPi;tðkÞ
i
P
q2P exp
h
lMPi;tðqÞ
i; (8)
which is similar to stage 1 (equation (4)) and where the change
in the motivationMPi;tðkÞ that individual i has at time t for patch k2
P is updated as follows
DMPi;tðkÞ ¼ dMPi;tðkÞ þ pPk;tIPik;t ; (9)
The ﬁrst term is again the discountedmotivation and the second
term is the patch payoff to an individual multiplied by the indicator
for the individual on the patch, which is equal to 1 if i feeds on patchk at time t and 0 otherwise. Note that individuals that have been
evicted from a patch do not positively reinforce their patch
motivations.
Action choice for aggression (stage 3). To determine action choice
for this stage, we letMTi;tðjÞ represent the motivation of individual i
to tolerate individual j (‘the tolerance’).
The change DMTi;tðjÞ ¼MTi;tþ1ðjÞMTi;tðjÞ in tolerance is assumed
to occur as follows:
DMTi;tðjÞ ¼ dMTi;tðjÞ þ bIGj/i;t  εIAij;tIEij;t ; (10)
where the ﬁrst term is the discounted motivation, the second term
is the increase in tolerance if i has been groomed by j in round t (as
in equation (6)), and the third term is the change in motivation as a
result of the outcome of aggressive interactions, which depends on
the parameter ε giving the impact of eviction on the motivation. In
this third term, IAij;t takes value 1 if a contest occurred between i and
j in round t and 0 otherwise, and IEij;t takes value 1 if i won the
contest, and otherwise it takes value 1 (where the probability of
winning a contest is given by equation (1)). Hence, thewinner of the
contest decreases its motivation to tolerate the loser of the contest,
while the loser increases its motivation to tolerate the winner.
In the aggression stage, each individual takes a sequence of
eviction decisions, one for each individual in its patch (one for each
j 2 Ei,t). We assume that the probability pTi;tðjÞ that individual i
wants to evict j is given by
pTi;tðjÞ ¼
1
1þ exp
h
MTi;tðjÞ  b
i: (11)
This is a logistic function bounded between 0 and 1 (see Fig. 1),
where the probability of engaging in a contest decreases with
increasing motivation for tolerance. As such, the function ensures
that a higher motivation for tolerance for individual j results in a
lower probability of engaging in a contest with that individual. The
parameter b can be seen as the intrinsic aggressiveness of the in-
dividuals, as it regulates the probability that i will engage in a
contest with j given its motivation to do so, since with the same
motivation a larger value for b increases the probability that i en-
gages in a contest with j (Fig. 1). According to equation (11) an in-
dividual makes a single decision for each other individual on the
patch and can therefore attempt to evict anywhere between no one
and all other individuals on the same patch.
We note that motivations can become negative in the model
(the last term in equation (10) may induce negative motivation),
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the sign of the motivations, but only their ranking. The model
could be rescaled such that motivations are only positive, but we
refrain from doing so for simplicity of presentation and model
analysis.
Descriptors of Interactions
To recapitulate, the model tracks the actions and the outcome of
actions of each individual i for each round t of interaction, that is,
whether or not it grooms individual j (IGi/j;t 2 {0, 1}), whether or
not it feeds on patch k (IPik;t 2 {0, 1}), whether or not it tries to evict j
(IAij;t 2 {0, 1}), whether it wins or loses a contest against j (I
E
ij;t 2
{1,1}), and thus to determinewith whom it co-feeds (ICij;t2 {0,1}).
This in turn will generate the networks of interactions, which will
emerge from the decisions taken and are of two kinds: ﬁrst, the
grooming network (how much each individual grooms every other
individual in the group), and second the feeding association
network (proportion of time that pairs of individuals feed
together), which can both be represented as graphs (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994).
To describe these networks, we ﬁrst let the learning process run
for Teq< T time steps so that it reaches a quasi-equilibrium state and
then characterize the networks in this state as follows. For the
grooming network we computed the fraction gij of time that indi-
vidual i spends grooming j at a quasi-equilibrium of the learning
process. This is deﬁned as
gij ¼
1
T  Teq
 XT
t¼Teqþ1
IGi/j;t ; (12)
where TTeq is the amount of time we record the grooming in-
teractions at quasi-equilibrium, whereby gi0 is the fraction of time i
grooms no one. From gij, we also computed the average fraction of
time that i receives grooming as
gi ¼
1
N
XN
j¼1
gji; (13)
whereby 1  gi gives the fraction of time i is not groomed.
Since we are interested in characterizing the grooming patterns,
we compute the proportion of grooming actions that are directed
up the hierarchy hu, which varies between zero and one
(0  hu  1). If hu ¼ 0.5 the amount of grooming received by higher-
ranked individuals is equal to the amount of grooming received by
lower-ranked individuals, while if hu ¼ 1 then all grooming actions
are directed towards an individual with a higher rank.
hu is calculated as
hu ¼ 1T  Teq
XT
t¼Teqþ1
PN
i¼1
PN
j> iI
G
i/j;tPN
i¼1
PN
j¼1I
G
i/j;t
; (14)
where the numerator in the second ratio is the number of grooming
actions in the group at time t that are directed towards an indi-
vidual with a higher rank, while the denominator is the total
number of grooming actions at that time. Furthermore, to describe
in more detail the pattern of grooming up the hierarchy, we also
consider the fraction of grooming (among all grooming in-
teractions) directed towards the alpha individual ha2 [0,1]. This is
computed asha ¼ 1T  Teq
XT
t¼Teqþ1
PN1
i¼1 I
G
i/N;tPN1
i¼1
PN
j¼1I
G
i/j;t
; (15)
where the numerator in the second ratio is the total number of
grooming actions directed towards the highest-ranked individual
(the ‘alpha individual’ which has rank N), and the denominator is
the total number of grooming actions. The fraction of grooming that
is directed one rank up the hierarchy (h1 2 [0,1]) is computed as
h1 ¼
1
T  Teq
 XT
t¼Teqþ1
PN1
i¼1 I
G
i/iþ1;tPN1
i¼1
PN
j¼1I
G
i/j;t
; (16)
To characterize the feeding association network, we compute
the frequency of feeding association between individuals i and j (aij)
as,
aij ¼
1
T  Teq
 XT
t¼Teqþ1
ICij;t ; (17)
where ICij;t is the co-feeding indicator function.We also compute the
(quasi-equilibrium) frequency that individual i is not evicted and
thus feeds on a patch (fi) as,
fi ¼ 1
1
T  Teq
 XT
t¼Teqþ1
XN
j¼1
IAij;t0:5

IEij;t  1

; (18)
where the second term is the fraction of time individual i has been
evicted. We subtract 1 from IEij;t to avoid counting the instances
where individual i has won a contest (where IEij;t ¼ 1). Finally, we
compute (at the quasi-stationary equilibrium), the average level of
tolerance t 2 [0,1] over all individuals in the population, which is
deﬁned as the fraction of time that an individual has not engaged in
a contest with a partner, given that it is not alone on its patch. If
t ¼ 0, an individual never tries to evict a partner, while if t ¼ 1 an
individual always try to evict a partner, given that it is not alone on
a patch.
Because the model is stochastic and highly nonlinear we
implemented it via individual-based simulations and tracked the
actions and statistical descriptors numerically (simulation ﬁle is
available on Figshare, https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.ﬁgshare.
5472811). For all reported results (see next section) we set all
motivations of all individuals initially to 0 (i.e. MGi;0 ¼MPi;0 ¼
MTi;0 ¼ 0), which implies that actions are uniformly distributed,
and then let the model run for T ¼ 5000 time steps while using a
period of Teq ¼ 4000 to reach the quasi-equilibrium state. We
veriﬁed that Teq ¼ 4000 time steps were generally enough to
reach a quasi-equilibrium state, as the pattern of variation in the
hierarchy score (hu) between replicates remains stable after
500e2000 time steps (see the Appendix). Assuming about seven
grooming interactions per day (e.g. rhesus monkeys, Macaca
mulatta, Lindburg, 1971), a period of 4000 time steps means a
learning period of 1.5 years. To assess sensitivity to initial con-
ditions we ran 10 replicates for each set of parameter values, and
thus when we report hierarchy scores (hu, ha, h1) and tolerance
level (t), we report their means (and sometimes standard errors).
The outcome of the model will be the emergence of different
grooming and association networks, depending on the intensity
of food competition and other model parameters. Although the
model uses a large number of parameters, our main interest is in
the parameters that regulate the intensity of the competition and
the value of the rewards (Table 1). The main parameters varied
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185170here are the number of patches (NP), the aggressiveness (b), the
beneﬁt of grooming (b), the dominance gradient (d) and the ef-
fect of patch quality (q0), while we investigate the effect of
varying group size (N) and the level of interference (m) in the
Appendix.
RESULTS
To gain intuition about the outcomes of the model, we ﬁrst
consider two special cases: grooming without food competition
(that is, no patch selection, aggressive interactions and feeding) and
food competition without grooming. Unless stated otherwise, all
results are based on the following baseline parameter values: c ¼ 1,
b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼1, d ¼ 2, q0 ¼ 6, m ¼ 0.5,
N ¼ 10 (Table 1).
Uncoupled Model
Grooming for grooming
To understand the incentive structure in our model, we start
with the simplest case of grooming interactions for group size
N ¼ 2 (skipping stages 2, 3 and 4 of an interaction round). In this
case, grooming motivations are only reinforced by receiving
grooming (equation (5) with pFij;t ¼ 0 always). This allows us to
investigate the conditions under which grooming as an equilibrium
behaviour emerges (as opposed to choosing the nongrooming ac-
tion ‘0’). For this case, we show in the Appendix that when l
dominates d (l >> d so that reinforcement dominates stochastic
choice), the change in the probabilities pG1;tð2Þ and pG2;tð1Þ that in-
dividual 1 grooms 2 and 2 grooms 1, respectively, can be approxi-
mated by the following differential equations.
dpG1;tð2Þ
dt
¼ l

1pG1;tð2Þ
h
pG2;tð1Þb

pG1;tð2Þcþ

1pG1;tð2Þ

g
i
dpG2;tð1Þ
dt
¼ l

1pG2;tð1Þ
h
pG1;tð2Þb

pG2;tð1Þcþ

1pG2;tð1Þ

g
i
:
(19)
The ﬁrst term in brackets in each equation shows that an indi-
vidual will increase the tendency to groom its partner propor-
tionally to the level of grooming of the partner multiplied by the
beneﬁt b; this captures reciprocity. The individual will decrease its
grooming according to a term (second one in parentheses in each
equation) that can be thought off as the average of the cost c of
grooming and the reward g of not grooming. Equation (19) makes
explicit that if both interacting partners have an initial tendency to
groom (pG1;0ð2Þ > 0 and pG2;0ð1Þ > 0), then it is possible that the
learning dynamic converges to both individuals grooming each
other. This is due to grooming being ‘reciprocated’ and thus rein-
forced over time. On the other hand, if an individual interacts with
another that has a very low grooming tendency, then it will not get
exploited and will reduce its level of grooming.
Equation (19) thus encapsulates the core behavioural assump-
tions behind our model and, from a quantitative point of view, the
global dynamics of learning depends on the parameter values. For
instance, while ﬁxing b ¼ 3 and c ¼ 1, we ﬁnd that for g ¼ 0.5 pairs
always end up grooming each other as the reinforcement when
choosing the nongrooming action is very low (Fig. 2d). For g ¼ 2,
which is equal to bc, the payoff of coordinating on either action
will be the same to an individual, so we ﬁnd that half the pairs end
up grooming, while the other half ends up not grooming (Fig. 2e).
For g ¼ 5 the reinforcement for not grooming is larger thangrooming an individual that grooms back (g > bc), and most pairs
end up not grooming (Fig. 2f).While the emergence of grooming for
grooming is affected by the differences between b and c, we note
that the parameter l, tuning the exploration of actions, also affects
the outcomes, and thus needs to be rescaled to obtain the same
qualitative results if b and c are varied proportionally. This is so
because under reinforcement learning, exploration of actions de-
pends on the absolute value of the payoffs and only when l be-
comes very large (so that there is no exploration of action, equation
(4)) would only the relative values of c and b matter for the
outcome; that is, only the relative payoff of actions matters.
For the remainder of the results we set g ¼ 0.5, as we want
grooming to emerge, and then determine when it will be directed
up the hierarchy. For instance, for N ¼ 10 with g ¼ 0.5 we ﬁnd that
(while still skipping the stages concerning food patch selection,
aggressive interactions and feeding) there exists virtually no vari-
ation in grooming propensity between individuals, and all in-
dividuals spend at least 98% of their time grooming others.
Although giving grooming decreases the motivation to repeat that
action, giving grooming to an individual that gives grooming back
results in an overall increase in the motivation to groom that in-
dividual (sincewe always assume b > c in equation (6)). As such, we
ﬁnd (as expected) that each individual converges on predominantly
grooming a single individual that also almost exclusively grooms
back (Fig. 3a). Pairs of individuals thus trade equal amounts of
grooming in the absence of food competition. This corresponds to
the time matching of grooming that is regularly found in primates
(e.g. Schino, Ventura, & Troisi, 2003).Tolerance without grooming
If the grooming stage is skipped, individuals can still select a
patch to feed, evict targets and feed, but there can be no grooming
for tolerance. In this case, tolerance motivation no longer depends
on grooming (equation (10) with IGj/i;t ¼ 0 always) but can still
depend on the contests that have occurred, and the number of
contests depends on the intrinsic aggressiveness of the individuals
(equation (11)). We thus ﬁnd that a larger b (higher aggressiveness)
results in less tolerance (Fig. 3b). Additionally, the number of
patches (NP) inﬂuences the average number of competitors on a
patch, which in turn inﬂuences the likelihood of engaging in a
contest with at least one other individual. Thus, fewer patches
means more competitors on the same patch and therefore less
tolerance (Fig. 3b).Full Model
Grooming up the hierarchy for tolerance
We now analyse how grooming for tolerance occurs in the full
model (allowing all four interaction stages to occur). We ﬁnd that if
there is food competition, not all individuals manage to feed on a
patch and several individuals get evicted. Regularly, no more than
two individuals feed on the same patch (Fig. 4a, c). A third (lower-
ranked) individual on the same patch would not be tolerated by at
least one other individual and thus gets evicted. Hence, individuals
tend to feed as dyads.
Although the distribution of the highest-ranked individuals over
the available food patches differs between replicates of simulations,
the highest-ranked individuals consistently segregate over the
patches to avoid competitionwith one another (Fig. 4a, c). Between
the individuals that feed together on a patch, the lower-ranked
individual always grooms the higher-ranked one more than the
higher-ranked individual grooms back and is the only individual
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Figure 3. (a) Typical grooming network when only the grooming stage occurs (no patch selection, aggressive interactions or feeding). Vertex size correlates with the proportion of
grooming i receives (gi), while the edges correlate with the grooming i gives to j (gij). Individuals tend to form grooming pairs, where the members of the pair groom one another
equally. For clarity, grooming proportions below 0.10 (gij < 0.10) are not plotted. (b) Tolerance (t, mean and error bars) as a function of the number of patches, in the absence of
grooming. Increasing aggressiveness (b) decreases the tolerance t. Note that variation in tolerance is nearly absent, resulting in error bars drawn as a line at the top of each bar.
Parameter values: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2, q0 ¼ 6, m ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10, with patch quality given by equation (3).
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Figure 2. Solution orbits of the approximate learning dynamics given by equation (A1) in the Appendix (a reﬁned version of equation (19) in the main text) and corresponding
results obtained from individual-based simulations for the case: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, N ¼ 2. (aec) The solution orbits describe the direction of change in the probability
pG1 ð2Þ (pG2 ð1Þ) that player 1 grooms 2 (2 grooms 1) and where the system will end up (either both partners groom each other or they do not groom). (def) Individual-based
simulations showing the realizations of the (stochastic) model, averaged over 1000 replicates from three different initial conditions for the probability of grooming at t ¼ 1: 0.5,
0.25 and 0.1 for every individual. (a, d) g ¼ 0.5, (b, e) g ¼ 2, (c, f) g ¼ 5. Note that for all panels bc ¼ 2. In (def) dashed lines are player 1 and dotted lines player 2 (the two lines
strongly overlap, however, showing that the individuals converge simultaneously). Note that for g ¼ 2 a single player does not groom half the time, but instead half the pairs
converge on grooming only and the other half on nongrooming only.
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Figure 4. Typical (a, c) feeding association and (b, d) grooming networks for identical parameter values as in Fig. 3 and b ¼ 1 but allowing for all interactions. (a, b) NP ¼ 2, (c, d)
NP ¼ 5. In the feeding association network, the vertex size correlates with the frequency i feeds (fi) while the edges correlate with the frequency i and j co-feed (aij). In the grooming
network the vertex size correlates with the proportion of grooming i receives (gi), while the edges correlate with the grooming i gives to j (gij). For clarity, associations and grooming
proportions below 0.10 are not plotted (i.e. aij < 0.10, gij < 0.10). Note that the numbers relate to the position in the hierarchy where individual 10 is the highest-ranked individual.
Individuals that feed together form an asymmetrical grooming relationship, while individuals that do not feed together form a symmetrical relationship (or they do not groom each
other).
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185172that is tolerated by the higher-ranked one (Fig. 4b, d). This is
quantitatively captured by our hierarchy score, hu, which is sys-
tematically above 0.5 (Figs 5 and 6). For individuals that do not co-
feed on a patch, the grooming between them is either balanced or
absent. Thus, only when individuals feed together is an imbalance
of grooming within that pair created where the higher-ranked in-
dividual receives additional grooming. Owing to the imbalance of
grooming between individuals sharing a patch (the lower-ranked
grooming more), we can thus conclude that our model generates
grooming for tolerance; namely, grooming is exchanged for toler-
ance during feeding.
We also ﬁnd that grooming up the hierarchy follows a system-
atic qualitative pattern in which the more there is grooming up the
hierarchy, the more this is directed towards the alpha individual.
We indeed ﬁnd a strong positive correlation between hu and ha(Pearson correlation: r ¼ 0.48, P < 0.01; Fig. 5). Conversely,
grooming just one rank up the hierarchy (h1) is negatively corre-
lated with hu (Pearson correlation: r ¼ 0.15, P ¼ 0.15). From the
feeding associations, as in Fig. 4, this is not surprising, since closely
ranked individuals segregate over the available food patches and
thus do not need to groom each other in order to be tolerated on a
patch. Occasionally, individuals with adjacent ranks may share a
patch, but it is clear fromour results that grooming up the hierarchy
is a result of the highest-ranked individuals (especially the alpha)
receiving additional grooming and not because individuals groom
one rank up the hierarchy.
Conditions favouring grooming for tolerance
We now delineate how grooming up the hierarchy depends on
various parameters, such as patch number and quality (affecting
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Figure 5. (a) Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the proportion of grooming directed towards the alpha (ha) and towards the individual one rank up the hierarchy (h1)
as a function of the number of patches. The dashed line shows the expected proportions if grooming actions were chosen randomly. (b) Mean and standard error of the hierarchy
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against ha, and the regression slope (solid line). Parameter values as in Fig. 4.
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185 173competition), aggressiveness and dominance gradient, and
grooming costs and beneﬁts.
We ﬁnd that grooming up the hierarchy depends markedly on
competition for resources. Indeed, the hierarchy score depends
strongly on the number of available food patches (Fig. 5b). If there is
just a single patch to feed on (NP ¼ 1), competition for feeding is
high, and thus there is little tolerance (t ¼ 0.04). Most individuals
are evicted from the patch, and will not groom for tolerance,
resulting in a hierarchy score close to 0.5 (hu ¼ 0.52). The slight
amount of grooming that does occur up the hierarchy (since
hu > 0.5) is due to the second highest-ranked individual being
tolerated and grooming the alpha.
If the number of food patches is increased, individuals will
segregate over the available patches (see Fig. 4). Fewer individuals
per patch means there will be less competition within each patch
and thus more tolerance (Fig. 3b). The highest-ranked individual oneach patch is likely to tolerate one other individual in exchange for
grooming (Fig. 4), and since these exchanges of grooming for
tolerance occur more frequently if there are more patches, then
there will consequently be more grooming up the hierarchy
(Fig. 5b). Most grooming up the hierarchy occurs for NP ¼ 4
(hu ¼ 0.61). A further increase in the number of patches alleviates
some of the competition, as individuals may sometimes ﬁnd
themselves alone on a patch, and therefore less tolerance and less
grooming up the hierarchy are required. We thus observe that the
hierarchy score is nonmonotonic in number of food patches, ﬁrst
increasing and then decreasing for NP > 4 (Fig. 5b). However, even
for high NP there remains an overall tendency to groom up the
hierarchy (hu ¼ 0.58 forNP ¼ 10), since the additional patches are of
such low quality that individuals avoid feeding on these (quality of
the best patch: Q1 ¼ 6; worst patch: Q10 ¼ 1.16). In the Appendix we
show that if there are as many patches as individuals and all
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Figure 6. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values as in Fig. 4. (a) b ¼ 3,
(b) b ¼ 3. The dashed line shows hu ¼ 0.5.
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185174patches are of equal quality, then grooming is completely reciprocal
(hu ¼ 0.50), since there is no co-feeding and grooming for tolerance
is not required (see section ‘Testing patch quality assumptions’ in
the Appendix). Thus, in the absence of competition for resources
we recover the grooming for grooming results (section ‘Grooming
for grooming’).
For the effect of patch quality on grooming, we ﬁnd that when
this quality is ranked (equation (3)) lowering the baseline quality,
q0, results in less grooming up the hierarchy. A lower patch quality
means that individuals gain less material (and thus motivational)
payoff on patches, and thus motivations for patch choice are less
strongly affected by feeding (equation (9)). Individuals are then
more likely to choose different patches at each time step and
therefore regularly encounter different individuals on the patch.
Strong feeding associations between individuals (i.e. feeding
together regularly) will therefore not occur and thus there will be
little grooming for tolerance (see Fig. A2a in the Appendix).
Increasing patch quality increases grooming up the hierarchy,
because higher-ranked individuals will be less inclined to groom
lower-ranked individuals, while lower-ranked individuals will
reward higher-ranking ones even more (equation (5)). Evicting
another individual has a ﬁxed effect on tolerance motivation, and
the effect of being groomed outweighs the effect of evicting (b > ε).
Therefore, if only the patch quality (q0) changes, dominant in-
dividuals would continue to tolerate subordinates.
Grooming up the hierarchy also depends on the intrinsic
aggressiveness of individuals (b). Lowering bmeans individuals are
less likely to engage in contests with others to evict them (in stage 3
of the interaction stage), and individuals are tolerated more often
(Fig. 3b). A consequence of more tolerance is that low-ranked in-
dividuals are more likely to reward higher-ranked individuals with
grooming and grooming up the hierarchy increases (Fig. 6a). The
effect of changing aggressiveness is most clear under conditions of
high food competition (i.e. low number of food patches). For NP ¼ 1
and b ¼ 3 the tolerance is greatly increased (t ¼ 0.84) as well as
the hierarchy score (hu ¼ 0.81). Conversely, higher aggressiveness
(b ¼ 3) increases the number of contests, thus lowering the toler-
ance. Then, if low-ranked individuals are not tolerated on food
patches, they do not groom higher-ranked ones in return. As such,increasing b results in less tolerance and thus grooming becoming
more reciprocal (i.e. hu/ 0.5), and for NP ¼ 4 we ﬁnd hu ¼ 0.56
(Fig. 6b).
We ﬁnd that a positive dominance gradient (d) is needed for
grooming to be directed up the hierarchy. If d ¼ 0, all individuals are
symmetrical in the sense that each has a 0.5 probability to win a
contest with every other individual (equation (1)). In this case, no
individual can consistently control a food patch by evicting others.
For d ¼ 0 we thus ﬁnd that hu ¼ 0.5 for any number of patches (NP),
showing that the intensity of food competition has no effect on
grooming decisions. If individuals are symmetrical, grooming mo-
tivations are no longer reinforced due to co-feeding (equation (5)
with pFij;t ¼ 0 always), and we thus ﬁnd that grooming is
exchanged for grooming (Fig. A3a). For d ¼ 2 the probability of
winning a contest with an individual one rank below is 0.88
(equation (1)) and thus a higher-ranked individual already wins
most contests. We ﬁnd that increasing the dominance gradient has
little effect on the hierarchy scores as the contest success function
(equation (1)) saturates (e.g. d ¼ 10; Fig. A3b).
Finally, we investigate how the cost to beneﬁt ratio of grooming
affects grooming up the hierarchy by varying the beneﬁt b (but
always holding b > c). If b is large, grooming motivations are
increasingly controlled by whom an individual is groomed (equa-
tion (5)), and thus grooming will become increasingly reciprocal
(for b ¼ 4.5 we ﬁnd hu ¼ 0.5 regardless of number of patches; see
Fig. A4b in the Appendix). The tolerance motivation similarly in-
creases with b (equation (10)), and thus we continue to ﬁnd in-
dividuals feeding together, but with reduced asymmetry of
grooming between them. Hence, we have grooming for grooming
with high tolerance. If b is low, we again observe a high tendency
for reciprocal grooming, since tolerance motivations will be less
affected by receiving grooming (see Fig. A4a in the Appendix).
Concomitantly, one then has less tolerance overall. This shows that
the beneﬁt of grooming (b) has a nonmonotonic effect on grooming
up the hierarchy.
Additional analyses and sensitivity of the results
In the Appendix we present several additional results to test
the robustness of our qualitative results. We show that the
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patches are of equal quality or of low and high quality, see
equation (3)) has a surprisingly small effect on the outcome (see
Fig. A5 in the Appendix). We also vary the group size N and the
interference while feeding (m) and ﬁnd that we can reproduce
qualitatively similar levels of grooming up the hierarchy (see Figs
A6 and A7 in the Appendix). Increasing group size lowers
grooming up the hierarchy slightly, however, since more dyads
groom reciprocally, while increasing interference has a similar
effect as lowering patch quality (q0) as both affect the payoff to an
individual on a patch, and thus both inﬂuence the strength of
feeding associations between individuals. Additionally, we
investigate whether a cost of grooming (c > 0) is necessary for
grooming to be directed up the hierarchy holding the beneﬁt b
ﬁxed. Like the case where c ¼ 1 (Fig. 5), we ﬁnd that with c ¼ 0
grooming is directed up the hierarchy, with most grooming up
the hierarchy for an intermediate number of patches (Fig. A8).
However, compared to the case where c ¼ 1 (Fig. 5), there is less
grooming up the hierarchy. This is because the absence of a cost
favours grooming being traded for grooming (equation (19))
while it has no direct impact on the tolerance motivation (which
is mainly affected by b, equation (10)). Overall, these results
support the ﬁndings presented in the section ‘Conditions
favouring grooming for tolerance’.
Furthermore, we attempt to create conditions where individuals
preferentially groom one rank up the hierarchy (instead of the
alpha individual). We do this by having patch payoff decrease
dramatically if more than two individuals feed on the same patch.
Then, by creating substantial differences in patch quality we expect
that mostly the highest-ranked individuals would feed together on
the highest-quality patch, the third- and fourth-ranked individuals
on the second highest-quality patch, and so forth. However, we ﬁnd
even under such conditions that grooming up the hierarchy is
preferentially directed towards the alpha individual (ha > h1, see
Fig. A9 in the Appendix).DISCUSSION
Grooming is maybe the most documented social behaviour in
the primate literature, as it is relatively easy to quantify and un-
derstanding its occurrence is a major goal (Schino, 2001; Seyfarth,
1980). Grooming is regularly found to be directed up the hierar-
chy, where lower-ranked individuals groom higher-ranked ones.
It has been argued that this occurs when there is competition for
food, where low-ranked individuals trade grooming for either
tolerance or coalitionary support from high-ranked ones. To
better understand the conditions under which this is likely to
occur, we here developed a quantitative reinforcement learning
model, where individuals make decisions on whom to groom,
where to feed, whom to tolerate on a food patch and where these
actions depend dynamically on payoffs. With this model we have
investigated under which conditions food competition can result
in grooming being directed up the hierarchy (qualitatively),
which grooming patterns emerge (which individuals receive
additional grooming) and under which conditions it is likely to
occur (and break down).Grooming for Tolerance
Our main ﬁnding is that low-ranked individuals are indeed
likely to trade grooming for tolerance from high-ranked individuals
(Fig. 4) leading to grooming being directed up the hierarchy (Fig. 5).
This matches the empirical observations made in various primate
species where grooming is regularly found to be traded fortolerance (Borgeaud & Bshary, 2015; Carne et al., 2011; Tiddi et al.,
2011; Ventura et al., 2006; Xia et al., 2012).
Our model thus demonstrates that grooming can be traded for
tolerance as a result of food competition. Seyfarth's (1977) simu-
lation model on grooming in female monkeys was seminal in
explicitly investigating grooming patterns. This model was rela-
tively simple in the sense that individuals only made grooming
decisions and were assumed to have an innate preference to groom
the highest-ranking individuals. However, under conditions where
high-ranked individuals cannot provide an alternative beneﬁt to
grooming (e.g. tolerance or coalitionary support) or are not willing
to give tolerance because there is more to gain from eating alone,
low-ranked individuals should adjust their grooming preferences
accordingly. With a ﬁxed preference, individuals would always
groom up the hierarchy. The current work is thus a logical next step,
since we allowed grooming preferences (motivation) to vary be-
tween individuals and over time. Our model successfully produced,
depending on the state of the environment, both grooming for
tolerance and grooming for grooming, the latter not being possible
in Seyfarth's model (1977). Our results thus demonstrate that dy-
namic motivations (or preferences) that are updated through
learning can capture a wider range of grooming patterns, and that
grooming up the hierarchy depends crucially on ecological and
behavioural conditions.
The Pattern of Grooming Up the Hierarchy
We ﬁnd that grooming up the hierarchy is mostly the result of
the alpha individual receiving additional grooming, but not the
individual one rank up the hierarchy (Fig. 5). It has been argued that
all individuals in a primate troop should be willing to preferentially
groom the alpha individual (followed by the second highest-ranked
individual, etc.), but that at the same time there is competition for
grooming access, which means that not all individuals can groom
their preferred target. Consequently, most individuals may end up
grooming adjacent-ranked individuals instead (Seyfarth, 1977,
1980). However, the evidence for both competition for grooming
access and more grooming between adjacent-ranked individuals is
mixed (in favour of competition for grooming access: Fairbanks,
1980; Schino, 2001, against: Henzi et al., 2003; Silk, 1982; in
favour of grooming adjacent ranked: Seyfarth, 1977; Seyfarth, 1980,
against: O'Brien, 1993; Thierry, Gauthier, & Peighnot, 1990).
Therefore, it is worth investigating which conditions lead to
competition for grooming access or increased grooming of
adjacent-ranked individuals.
In ourmodel we do not ﬁnd preferential grooming of individuals
one rank above in the hierarchy. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that
adjacent-ranked individuals tend to avoid one another in order to
be the highest-ranked individual on their chosen food patch
(Fig. 4). In the absence of feeding associations between adjacent-
ranked individuals, there is no incentive for the lower-ranked in-
dividual to groom the higher-ranked one for tolerance. Therefore,
the factors causing individuals to groom one rank up or down the
hierarchy need further investigation, but it seems unlikely that this
is directly caused by food competition. An interesting/logical
extension of the current model would be to introduce some form of
competition for grooming partners to investigate whether such a
restriction will result in individuals grooming adjacent-ranked in-
dividuals more frequently.
Conditions Where Grooming Up the Hierarchy Occurs and Breaks
Down
We have quantiﬁed how the intensity of food competition (due
to the number of food patches, aggressiveness, etc.) modulates the
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(Sterck et al., 1997) tries to understand how food competition,
predation risk and infanticide risk determine various aspects of
primate societies (e.g. patterns of migration, dominance hierarchies
and grooming behaviour; van Schaik, 1996; Sterck et al., 1997;
Koenig, 2002; Kappeler & van Schaik, 2002). While the socio-
ecological model predicts that food competition may cause
grooming to be directed up the hierarchy, it does not give quanti-
tative predictions regarding how the intensity of food competition
will modulate the grooming patterns (it only distinguishes be-
tween types of competition, Sterck et al., 1997).
Using the socioecological model as a premise for our own
analysis, we ﬁnd that our model produces patterns of grooming
up the hierarchy due to food competition similar to ﬁndings in
the primate literature (Carne et al., 2011; Tiddi et al., 2011;
Ventura et al., 2006; Xia et al., 2012). Although it is argued in
these studies that grooming is traded for tolerance on food
sources, the intensity of food competition is rarely investigated.
However, our model shows that the relationship between food
competition and grooming up the hierarchy is not necessarily
linear (Fig. 5). We ﬁnd that grooming up the hierarchy is maxi-
mized for an intermediate number of food patches as these
conditions facilitate grooming being traded for tolerance between
pairs of individuals (Fig. 4d). Fewer available food patches (high
food competition) decreases the number of individuals that
manage to feed on a food patch and thus fewer individuals trade
grooming for tolerance. In contrast, higher numbers of food
patches will result in individuals feeding alone and in the absence
of competition these individuals thus also do not trade grooming
for tolerance. Therefore, to better understand observed patterns
of grooming behaviour in primates, it is crucial to quantify the
intensity of food competition.
Additionally, we identiﬁed conditions under which grooming
will be traded for grooming instead of tolerance. For example, the
model predicts that when there is a sufﬁcient number of high-
quality patches available grooming will be reciprocal (see Fig. A5b
in the Appendix). This matches the ﬁnding by Pazol and Cords
(2005) that, despite the presence of a dominance hierarchy, blue
monkeys, Cercopithecus mitis, actively avoided one another while
feeding, and high- and low-ranking individuals therefore received
equal amounts of grooming. Similarly, in baboon, Papio cyn-
ocephalus, troops where individuals did not compete for resources,
a strong time-matching pattern of grooming was found (Barrett
et al., 1999).
Ourmodel also predicts that high aggressiveness can lead to less
grooming up the hierarchy (Fig. 6b). This conforms to the ﬁnding of
Leinfelder et al. (2001) that grooming is solely traded for grooming,
despite the presence of monopolizable food sources, and this is
attributed to high food-related aggression. Obviously, aggressive-
ness varies between individuals, groups and species (Fairbanks
et al., 2004; Isbell, 1991). However, for the sake of simplicity we
used a single parameter to set the aggressiveness of all individuals
here. This showed that high aggression results in grooming being
traded for grooming. Further work is required to investigate how
grooming networks are affected if aggressiveness can vary between
individuals.
Finally, there may exist other factors that are not captured in our
model, which also can favour reciprocal grooming over grooming
up the hierarchy. For example, in a troop of bluemonkeys grooming
was found to be traded reciprocally, but this appeared to be the
result of intense between-group competition, which increases the
importance of group cohesiveness leading to equal shares of
grooming within dyads (Rowell et al., 1991). Since we investigatedgrooming only as a result of within-group competition, such effects
could not occur in our model.
Emotional Bookkeeping
Although primates reciprocate grooming and trade grooming
for other commodities, the mechanistic processes underlying
these decisions are difﬁcult to unravel. One of the hypothesized
explanations for how primates take actions in a social context is
through emotional bookkeeping (Aureli & Schaffner, 2002;
Schino & Aureli, 2009, 2017). Primates are thought to have
partner-speciﬁc emotions that guide their decision-making pro-
cess. Receiving beneﬁts, in various currencies, are translated into
single variables (emotions) in an individual towards those that
provided the beneﬁt. Through social interactions individuals will
form differential social relationships. The emotions can thus be
seen as a measure of the relationship quality and will determine
the actions an individual takes in a social context. Evidence
supporting emotional bookkeeping has been found in various
species (Schino & Pellegrini, 2009; Schino, Di Giuseppe, &
Visalberghi, 2009).
Our model can be interpreted as an application of emotional
bookkeeping, where the motivations for taking actions (equations
(5), (9) and (10)) can be seen as emotional states, since they reﬂect
the history of interactions between the individuals. Different cur-
rencies are translated into a single motivation: both tolerance and
receiving grooming affect the grooming motivation (equation (5)).
Our model provides a quantitative example of how partner-speciﬁc
motivations (or emotions) may be updated through interactions
with social partners or decay over time. Different types of in-
teractions (grooming, co-feeding, contests) can all affect a single
motivation, which consequently will determine the actions an in-
dividual takes that are associated with that motivation. Our model
shows that through such updating mechanisms stable grooming
bonds can be formed between individuals, while at the same time it
allows for interchange of currencies (grooming for tolerance) be-
tween individuals of different ranks (Fig. 4).
Assumptions of the Model
Our model is a proximate one that captures grooming and
feeding actions in a group of interacting individuals, and we did not
study the evolution of the learning rules here. Therefore, we have
made a variety of assumptions for this model, especially regarding
how motivations are updated as a result of payoff received.
We used a reinforcement learning model (instead of an
evolutionary model) because both food sources and grooming
partners ﬂuctuate widely in a primate's life (Borgeaud, Sosa,
Bshary, Sueur, & van de Waal, 2016), which makes it likely that
social strategies are learned as it allows an individual to respond
to the variation in social partners and the environments it will
experience over its life span. We assumed that individual i's
motivation to groom individual j increases when i is groomed by j,
while it decreases when i grooms j. This updating matches the
logic of reciprocal strategies occurring under repeated in-
teractions, the most well-known, perhaps, being tit-for-tat, which
can be seen as a simple learning strategy (Dridi & Lehmann,
2014). We also chose parameter values such that grooming is
favoured in the model (see Fig. 2). The assumptions of our model
thus do not favour ‘cheating’ behaviour (choosing not to groom),
since grooming acts are likely to be reciprocated. We were
interested in patterns of grooming behaviour here, and not in
how individuals can avoid being cheated.
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185 177Regarding tolerance, we assumed that winning a contest would
increase the probability of engaging in a contest with the same
individual in future time steps (thus becoming less tolerant). Since
evicting another individual from a food patch is likely to increase
the payoff of the evicting individual in nature, repeating such an
actionwill increase its payoff similarly in future time steps, and this
learning rule is thus likely to increase the payoff overall. Finally, we
assumed that receiving grooming will increase the tolerance to-
wards the groomer, which has been shown experimentally
(Borgeaud & Bshary, 2015), and we assumed that tolerating a
lower-ranked individual causes the higher-ranked one to be less
likely to groom that individual, which is a logical consequence if
grooming is to be traded for tolerance only instead of both toler-
ance and grooming.
Although we made only assumptions regarding direct effects of
actions and payoffs on motivations, these assumptions imply that
various behavioural feedbacks will occur in themodel. For example,
while grooming motivations are not directly affected by aggressive
interactions, these interactions do determine which individuals
feed together on a patch, and co-feeding in turn does affect
grooming motivations. As such, aggression feeds back on grooming
decisions. Likewise, being evicted from a patch does not directly
decrease the motivation to visit that patch in future time steps, but
as the individual will no longer feed from it, over time it will learn
not to visit the patch any more as a result of behavioural feedbacks.
Hence, there is no need to consider any direct effects of aggression
and eviction onmotivations, and themodel takes the consequences
of these behaviours into account on action choice in a parsimonious
way.
Outlook
Our model generates patterns of grooming reciprocity (trading
grooming for grooming) and grooming up the hierarchy (trading
grooming for tolerance), which matches a number of grooming
patterns in natural populations. These different patterns emerge
from the model when its parameters are varied. Therefore, it
would be useful to test how well these parameters can explain
the variation in grooming patterns in natural populations. For
example, we have shown that the amount of grooming up the
hierarchy does not necessarily increase with increasing food
competition (Fig. 5), while high aggressiveness suppresses
grooming up the hierarchy (Fig. 6). Using the wealth of primate
data in the literature, such relationships can be tested quantita-
tively (e.g. using meta-analysis; Schino, 2001; Schino, 2007;
Schino & Aureli, 2008). For example, the degree of reciprocity
in grooming as a function of hierarchy can be evaluated per
species (or population) in a similar way as hu in our model. This
index can then be correlated with a variety of other measures
such as the frequency with which individuals feed together, the
tolerance around food or the hierarchy steepness. While a good
index for the degree of tolerance around food is difﬁcult to
quantify in natural populations, one could measure the maximum
distance at which a dominant individual tolerates a subordinate
with a certain probability (Borgeaud & Bshary, 2015). Alterna-
tively, the number of individuals within a certain range (e.g. 5 m)
during foraging could be used (as such data may be more readily
available). Our model has yielded various predictions regarding
how grooming up the hierarchy correlates with the number of
food patches, aggressiveness, dominance gradient, etc. These
predictions can thus usefully guide comparative studies and
meta-analysis investigating grooming patterns and social re-
lationships in primates.Acknowledgments
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Stochastic Approximation of Learning Dynamics
For the case N ¼ 2 and assuming only grooming interactions
(skipping stages 2, 3 and 4 of an interaction round), we can
straightforwardly derive differential equations for the probabilities
pG1;tð2Þ and pG2;tð1Þ that individual 1 grooms 2 and 2 grooms 1,
respectively, by way of applying stochastic approximation as
detailed in Dridi and Lehmann (2014, 2015). Indeed, using equa-
tions (5e6) of the main text (by setting pFij;t), we have by using
equations (11) and (13) of Dridi and Lehmann (2014) thatþ

1 pG1;tð2Þ

g
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þ
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g
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:
(A1)If we further assume that l dominates d (l >> d), then we can
neglect the ﬁrst terms in these equations (which account for
randomness in choice) and simply write(A2)
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185 179which is the equation presented in the main text. To compare this
with individual-based simulations (see Fig. 2), we used equation
(A1).
Quasi-equilibrium
To determine whether Teq ¼ 4000 is a sufﬁcient time period to
reach the quasi-equilibrium, we investigated how the standard
deviation of our main statistic, the hierarchy score (hu), varied over
time.We ﬁnd in general that the standard deviation slowly drops in
roughly the ﬁrst 500e2000 time steps, after which it continues to
vary, but the pattern of variation remains stable (Fig. A1). Therefore,
a period of Teq ¼ 4000 interaction steps is sufﬁcient to reach the
quasi-equilibrium.0.3
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Figure A1. The standard deviation (over 100 replicates) in hierarchy score (hu) as a function of time. Parameter values: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2,
q0 ¼ 6, m ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10. (a) NP ¼ 2, (b) NP ¼ 5.Conditions Where Grooming Up the Hierarchy Occurs and Breaks
Down
Effect of patch quality
Fig. A2 illustrates the effect of varying the patch quality (q0) on
grooming up the hierarchy (hu). The grooming up the hierarchy
score increases with increasing patch quality (q0).1
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Figure A2. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches, for low- and high-quality patches. Parameter
values: c¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d¼ 0.1, b¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, d¼ 2,m¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10, with patch quality given by equation (3). (a) q0 ¼ 3, (b) q0¼ 9. The dashed line shows hu ¼ 0.5.
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Fig. A3 illustrates the effect of varying the dominance gradient
(d) on grooming up the hierarchy (hu). In the absence of a domi-
nance gradient (d ¼ 0, Fig. A3a) grooming is completely reciprocal
(hu ¼ 0.5 for any number of patches).1
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Figure A3. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches, for the absence of a dominance gradient
and high dominance gradient. Parameter values: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, q0 ¼ 6, m ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10, with patch quality given by equation (3). (a) d ¼ 0, (b)
d ¼ 10. The dashed line shows hu ¼ 0.5.Effect of beneﬁt of grooming
Fig. A4 illustrates the effect of varying the beneﬁt of grooming
(b) on grooming up the hierarchy (hu). Both decreasing b (Fig. A4a)
and increasing b (Fig. A4b), compared to the baseline case in the
main text (Fig. 5b), reduces grooming up the hierarchy, thus
showing that the hierarchy score is nonmonotonic in b.1
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Figure A4. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches, for low and high beneﬁt of grooming.
Parameter values: c ¼ 1, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2, q0 ¼ 6, m ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10, with patch quality given by equation (3). (a) b ¼ 1.5, (b) b ¼ 4.5. The dashed line shows
hu ¼ 0.5.
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Testing patch quality assumptions
Using different assumptions regarding patch quality does not
have a qualitative effect on the outcome. We tested both the case
where the patch quality is either high or low and the case where all
patches are of equal quality (see section ‘Stage 4: Feeding’ from the
main text for additional information on our assumptions regarding
feeding). Despite alternative assumptions regarding quality, we
continue to ﬁnd that the hierarchy score (hu) is nonmonotonic in
the number of patches (NP), where the score is maximized for an
intermediate number of patches and decreases for more or fewer
patches (Fig. A5). Additionally, for NP ¼ 10 when all patches are of
equal quality we ﬁnd that grooming is exactly reciprocal. Here, all
individuals will maximize payoff when feeding alone on a patch,
and thus there is no incentive to groom for tolerance.1
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Figure A5. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches, for different assumptions regarding
patch quality. Parameter values: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2, q0 ¼ 4,m ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10. (a) High/low patch quality scenario, (b) equal patch quality scenario.
The dashed line shows hu ¼ 0.5.Effect of group size
To determine the robustness of our results we varied the group
size (N). We ﬁndwe can qualitatively reproduce similar patterns for
the grooming up the hierarchy score (hu) for group sizes ranging
from ﬁve to 100 (Fig. A6). For group sizes N ¼ 5, 50 and 100 (and
N ¼ 10 in the main text), the model produces either grooming up
the hierarchy that is maximized for a few patches, a nonmonotonic
relationship with number of patches or reciprocal grooming,
depending on the level of aggressiveness. Leaving all else equal,
however, a larger group sizewill result inmore reciprocal grooming
as there will be a smaller proportion of the group feeding on the
available patches (Fig. A6).
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Figure A6. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches, for different group sizes and levels of
aggressiveness. Parameter values: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2, q0 ¼ 6, m ¼ 0.5, with patch quality given by equation (3). (a) N ¼ 5, b ¼ 6, (b) N ¼ 50, b ¼ 6,
(c) N ¼ 100, b ¼ 6, (d) N ¼ 5, b ¼ 3, (e) N ¼ 50, b ¼ 3, (f) N ¼ 100, b ¼ 3, (g) N ¼ 5, b ¼ 0, (h) N ¼ 50, b ¼ 0, (i) N ¼ 100, b ¼ 0.
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Whereas the number of patches NP determines the average
number of other individuals a focal individual has to compete with
on a food patch, the interference parameterm regulates the level of
interference. That is, the larger m is the more food is wasted when
multiple individuals are feeding on the same patch. We ﬁnd thatincreasing m results in less grooming up the hierarchy (hu de-
creases, Fig. A7a, c). Reducingm has the same effect as reducing q0,
since it reduces the payoff when individuals co-feed on a patch. If
individuals gain less payoff when feeding on a patch, strong feeding
associations (high aij) between individuals are less likely to occur,
since individuals will vary their patch choice more. This results in
M. Wubs et al. / Animal Behaviour 138 (2018) 165e185 183low-ranking individuals not grooming for tolerance. We ﬁnd that
increasing the average patch quality through q0 counters the effect
of increasing m (Fig. A7b, d).1
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Figure A7. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches, for different levels of interference and
patch quality. Parameter values: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2, N ¼ 10, with patch quality given by equation (3). (a) m ¼ 1, q0 ¼ 6, (b) m ¼ 1, q0 ¼ 10, (c)
m ¼ 1.5, q0 ¼ 6, (d) m ¼ 1.5, q0 ¼ 14. Whereas increasing m makes grooming more reciprocal (hu/ 0.5), increasing q0 cancels the effect. The dashed line shows hu ¼ 0.5.Cost of grooming
With c ¼ 0 grooming another individual will no longer reduce
the motivation to groom that individual, and therefore grooming
bonds aremore easily formed (equation (19)). We thus ﬁnd reduced
levels of grooming up the hierarchy in the absence of a cost of
grooming (Fig. A8), although qualitatively the pattern matches our
main result (Fig. 5b).
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Figure A8. Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (t) as a function of the number of patches, in the absence of a cost of grooming.
Parameter values: c ¼ 0, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2, q0 ¼ 6, m ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10, with patch quality given by equation (3). The dashed line shows hu ¼ 0.5.
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To identify conditions where individuals are likely to groom one
rank up the hierarchy, we performed several additional simulations
where we (rather artiﬁcially) created conditions where we would
expect such grooming to occur. We used a different equation to
compute the payoff per individual on a patch here, where indi-
vidual payoff drops sharply if more than two individuals feed from
the same patch (Fig. A9a, b). Such payoffs will ‘force’ the group to
feed in pairs on the available patches. Fig. A9c shows that the
proportion of grooming directed to the alpha is still higher than one
rank up the hierarchy. On closer inspection we ﬁnd that the second
highest-ranked individual avoids feeding with the alpha here sinceits payoff is maximized by feeding on patch k ¼ 2 and receiving
extra grooming. If it fed on the same patch as the alpha it would
have to invest in grooming the alpha and thus, despite the higher
payoff from feeding, would get a lower overall payoff. Increasing
the payoff difference between patches does increase the proportion
of grooming that is directed one rank up the hierarchy (Fig. A9d
where payoffs are as in Fig. A9b). However, the proportion of
grooming directed to the alpha still slightly outweighs the pro-
portion of grooming one rank up the hierarchy. As such, our model
cannot explain grooming of closely ranked individuals very well.
Other factors not captured by ourmodel may lead to such grooming
occurring more frequently.
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Figure A9. (a, b) Payoff per individual as a function of the number of individuals on a patch, for all ﬁve patches. (c, d) Proportion of grooming alpha and proportion grooming one
rank up the hierarchy (mean over 10 replicates) with the patch payoffs as in (a) and (b), respectively. Parameter values: c ¼ 1, b ¼ 3, g ¼ 0.5, l ¼ 0.25, d ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 1, ε ¼ 1, d ¼ 2,
m ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 10, NP ¼ 5.
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